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Abstract: Philosophy of film without theory is a methodology that aims to mo-
tivate and legitimise the current and future development of a range of a-, non-,
and anti-theoretical ways of working at the intersection of film and philosophy. We
contrast philosophy of film without theory with the main traditions of theoretically
orientated philosophy of film, as well as philosophically inflected film Theory and
film-philosophy. We also draw attention to the range of philosophical practices and
pursuits that distinguish philosophy (in general) without theory and contemporary
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philosophy (in general) with its near ubiquitous theoretical presumption. The
paper finishes with a brief introduction to the various contributions to this Special
Issue of Aesthetic Investigations on Philosophy of Film without theory.
Philosophy of film without theory is a newly articulated, open-ended method-
ology that aims to legitimise a-, non- and anti-theoretical methods and ways
of working at the intersection of film and philosophy. One might reason-
ably assume from the main title of leading film scholars David Bordwell and
Noël Carroll’s 1996 volume, Post-Theory: Reconstructing Film Studies, that
the very idea of working in a-, non-, anti-theoretical ways has been under-
way for nearly three decades.1 Not so. For Bordwell and Carroll’s title did
not herald any stepping away from, or moving beyond, theoretically orien-
tated philosophical engagement with film. Rather, the editors’ stated aim
for their volume was to justify piecemeal theorising. Bordwell and Carroll
were not eschewing the very idea of theory-creation or the pursuit of the-
oretical explanations, they were asserting that there was a new, and quite
different, alternative to the practice of ‘doing Theory’ found in the Conti-
nental philosophy-inspired activities then hegemonic in various areas of film
academia.
In their Introduction to Post-Theory, Bordwell and Carroll announced,
‘What is coming after Theory is not another Theory but theories and the
activity of theorising.’2 In other words, ‘Post-Theory’ is not a matter of
philosophising without theory, it is a collection of alternatively conceived theo-
retical approaches. In contrast to Theory (with a capital ‘T’) these theoretical
(lower case ‘t’) approaches were, and continue to be, informed by many of the
dominant commitments guiding anglophone analytic philosophy in the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century; specifically commitments to Quine’s vision
of philosophy as ‘continuous with science’.3 In ‘Prospects for Film Theory’,
Carroll’s own contribution to his co-edited volume, he enjoined the more Con-
tinentally orientated film Theorists to a theoretical showdown in the name
of progress.4 He proposed an interactive ‘methodologically robust pluralism’:
a shared enterprise in which competing theories about film would be eval-
uated and revised along the lines of standard scientific practice, i.e., where
possible theories would be consolidated, where necessary eliminated.5 In pro-
moting the need for this joint effort, Carroll criticised those Theorists whose
work owed much to the substance and preoccupations of Louis Althusser,
Jacques Lacan, Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, and others,
dismissing their prose stylings as ‘arcane peregrinations’, condemning their
suspicions of science as ‘feckless’, and evaluating their interpretations of films
as the products of a ‘standard-issue sausage machine churning out readings
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that look and smell the same’.6 Unsurprisingly, the theoretical battle went
unjoined; what rapidly became identified as cognitive film theory remained
alone on its own side of the Continental divide.
A quarter of a century later, the theory vs. Theory wars are over – and
nobody won. Bordwell and Carroll, together with many of their cognitivist-
inclined theorising colleagues, including Greg Currie and Carl Plantinga, con-
tinue to engage with, and in the spirit of, those naturalising philosophers of
mind, empirical researchers, and cognitive scientists, whose cognitivism often
assumes propositional and/or representational theories of the mind/brain.7
The various strands of Theory and the preoccupations of those who ‘do The-
ory’ – be they Marxist, psychoanalytic, feminist, etc. – have continued their
own intellectual evolution, albeit many eschewing the capital ‘T’. One of
us suggests elsewhere that one way of understanding the orientations and
methodological preoccupations of so-called ‘film-philosophy’ is to see it as
a re-booting and re-branding of film Theory, in the wake of Bordwell and
Carroll’s 1996 onslaught.8
Whilst one can recognise comparable tensions and developments in the
philosophy of literature, there is a crucial difference between film and litera-
ture. The practices, activities, institutions, readers, writers, listeners, view-
ers, critics, genre(s), etc., that constitute literature have existed, in various
forms, for two and a half millennia, whilst those pertaining to film are barely a
century old. By comparison, the contexts, world views, and possible method-
ological orientations available to viewers, critics, makers and philosophers
of film are, and have inevitably been, much more circumscribed. Indeed,
where serious reflection on literature has been informed by (and regularly
reacted to and helped to shape) almost the entire extant history of ideas
of humankind, film-making and the serious engagement with its productions
have been informed almost entirely by the particularities and peculiarities of
our intellectual history and philosophy for a fraction of that time.
Specifically, philosophical engagement with, and reflection on, film is lim-
ited to three main traditions whose adherents and/or legatees continue today.
These three, all unabashedly theoretical, traditions are:
(1) classical film theory - driven by the goal of justifying the very possi-
bility that a new technical invention could give rise to works worthy of being
considered art. This began in the second decade of the twentieth century.
Some of the classical film theorists’ preoccupations, particularly the relation
between value and medium-specificity, are currently being revived and rein-
vigorated by a number of contemporary philosophers of film.9
(2) Theory or Grand Theory – driven by, and incorporating, Marxist,
psychoanalytic, feminist, post-modern, structuralist, post-structuralist, semi-
ological and other, sometimes, so-called ‘Continental’ orientations whose aca-
demic interdependencies, evolution, and initial ascendency coincided – in the
1960s and 70s – with the decline of classical film theory and the increasing ar-
rogation and consolidation of film and television into the intellectual fabric of
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Theory-orientated communities. The classical film theorists’ mission had (on
their own terms) been made redundant through the unassailable empirical
evidence of cinematic masterpieces: a film could be a work of art. For those
‘doing Theory’, however, the notion of a work – and thus the very possibility
that some works might be art – is subservient to, and less informative than,
the notion of a text, and the ubiquity of texts. Interest in (interrogating)
texts for their ideological implications and revelations overtakes aesthetic or
epistemological attention. Also, within, or emerging from, this tradition are
a number of responses to 1996’s Post Theory challenges. These include not
only ‘film-philosophy’, but the theoretical application of the work of other
philosophers (e.g., Heidegger) or recent philosophical traditions (e.g., phe-
nomenology) to film.
(3) cognitive or piecemeal film theory – driven by the perceived importance
of acknowledging and incorporating the increasingly naturalising methods and
deliverances of philosophy of mind and cognitive science. This tradition was
underway by the mid-1990s and is ongoing.
This preliminary sketch of the three broad traditions that have created,
shaped and directed scholarly and philosophical encounters with film demands
much more finessing than there is space for here.10 Suffice it to say, of course,
that not all analytic anglophone philosophers of the last half-century period
are card-carrying Quineans and not all those who champion cognitive film
theory actually do it or do it all the time.11 Unsurprisingly, a number of
theoreticians aligned with a specific tradition are developing interests in the
work of one or more of the other traditions, and there are also a number
of non-conformists, such as Stanley Cavell, whose writings on film cannot
be obviously situated within any of the three alternative traditions.12 Thus
there is little value, today, in rehearsing those scholarly tensions that have
fuelled the analytic-Continental divide. That said, the 2019 collected vol-
ume, Philosophy and Film: Bridging Divides offers twenty papers premised
on the idea that the divide not only continues but is somehow exhaustive,
and thereby invites or requires bridging.13 Only two individual contributors,
Malcolm Turvey and Robert Sinnerbrink, reflect on either the substance or
value of either their own, or others’, methods and methodologies. The result
is a volume in which it is not the authors but the readers who might (in the
future) bridge divides, thanks to the opportunity to island-hop amongst the
archipelago of contributions from authors who (apart from Turvey and Sin-
nerbrink) remain siloed in their own recognisable theoretical traditions.14 As
if to confirm this, Thomas Wartenberg’s brief Preface declares that between
‘analytic and continental philosophers of film . . . there has not been sufficient
cross-fertilisation’.15 The very idea of doing philosophy of film without theory
is, therefore, orthogonal to all three of these theoretical traditions and their
associated meta-philosophical orientations.
As a preliminary to characterising the methodological ambitions and ap-
proaches of philosophy without theory, we offer a characterisation of philoso-
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phy with theory, or indeed philosophy as theory. Theoretical philosophy – as a
methodology rather than a subject matter, or subject area division – includes
some, though not necessarily all, of the following: the search for and justi-
fication of law-like regularities; generalisations and/or universalisable claims
that seek to unify or totalise; the postulation and exploitation of unobserv-
able theoretical posits (both physical and metaphysical); concept creation;
the pursuit of a-historical, a-temporal, context-free, non-situated facts; the
use of mathematical and algorithmic techniques and expressions; the reduc-
tion of person-level characteristics, features and abilities to the sub-personal
level; the assumption that resistance to physicalism entails a commitment
to supernaturalism; prioritising the third-personal point of view often to the
exclusion of all others; presuming the possibility and authority of the view
from nowhere; and more.16
Whilst many of these theoretical activities are standard components of
today’s scientific practice, the suitability of such methods for philosophical
investigations remains a contentious meta-philosophical question. For those
who embrace the third tradition above – the Quinean path of taking philoso-
phy to be continuous with science – this is, of course, not a problem. For those
who are more cautious about the implications of collapsing the distinction be-
tween, or value of, science and philosophy – or science and the humanities
tout court – embracing such theoretical methods and methodologies risks be-
ing scientistic.17 Scientism is the activity of applying scientific principles
and practices beyond the realm of their legitimate use. Scientistic misap-
plication of scientific methods and criteria to the activity of philosophising
risks imperilling philosophical investigations into, and understanding of, the
non-reducible aspects of ourselves and our human world. This is not to say
that science per se, as an empirical investigation into the world is somehow
a flawed enterprise: only that is a distinct one, with its own methodological
underpinnings, ambitions and achievements.
By contrast, philosophy without theory, as a methodology, holds that the
following methods are legitimate philosophical practices: fine-grained descrip-
tion and discernment; disentangling confusions; reactive and/or reflective crit-
ical inquiry; the exploration of conceptual connections; conceptual clarifica-
tion and synthesis; logical geography; the provision of perspicuous presenta-
tions and surveyable overviews; non-systematic engagement with individual
or particular works, subjects, objects, ideas, events and/or situations; and an
appreciation that the view is always from somewhere and at some time, etc.
Philosophy of film, in embracing philosophy without theory, also includes the
importance of focussing on, and paying close attention to, individual films.
As a matter of historical record, we chose to characterise this methodol-
ogy we champion as philosophy of film without theory, rather than use the
more familiar a-, non-, or anti-theoretical terminology for three reasons: (i)
to draw attention to the thoroughgoingly theoretical nature of the three seem-
ingly distinct traditions of philosophy of film and film studies, to date, whilst
179
Inaugurating Philosophy of Film Without Theory
simultaneously offering an opportunity and rubric with which to break from
them; (ii) to avoid current and future confusion with Bordwell and Carroll’s
idea and book, Post-Theory; and (iii) to create a novel, succinct, and hope-
fully memorable name for the first conference in this new area, which we
hosted at the University of York, in January 2019, and which has led, in the
first instance, to this Special Issue.18
The full justification of the without theory methodology would be an ex-
ercise in meta-philosophy deserving of a monograph of its own. Its roots are
in the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein, for whom philosophy is neither an
empirical science nor an a priori science, since philosophy is not a science.
On this appreciation of what philosophy is per se, it is not a quest for new
knowledge, but for understanding.19 Its methods include those in the without
theory catalogue listed above; its goal is conceptual clarification and the dis-
solution of philosophical problems, the result of which might then contribute
inter alia to scientific inquiry. In pursuing understanding, rather than sci-
entific knowledge, the philosopher’s goals include making sense of our world
and ourselves, albeit not in scientific ways. As Wittgenstein puts it, in the
Philosophical Investigations, ‘And we may not advance any kind of theory.
There must not be anything hypothetical in our considerations. All expla-
nation must disappear, and description alone must take its place.’20 If the
philosophical goal is to enrich our understanding and appreciation of films,
film-making, and film-viewing then examining them more closely, in ways
that can eschew theorising, is crucial.21
In 2001, Richard Allen and Malcolm Turvey edited their ground-breaking
collection Wittgenstein, Theory and the Arts, in which the very possibility of
such a Wittgensteinian, a- or non-theoretical conception of philosophy of art
was articulated and celebrated. And, of course, Stanley Cavell was probably
the first philosopher, nearly half-a-century ago now, to marry his unique
brand of Wittgensteinianism with an unquenchable enthusiasm for movies,
thereby bringing their union to its unique fruition. Apart from Allen and
Turvey’s own intellectual film-related trajectories, and the work of various
Cavellian scholars, almost no-one has pursued methods in the philosophy
of film that are in sympathy to those of Wittgenstein.22 Whilst we trust
this Special Issue is a (further) sign that this is beginning to change, it is
by no means necessary to be ‘a Wittgensteinian’ or to ‘do Wittgensteinian
philosophy of film’, whatever that might mean, in order to be amenable to
the methodological expansion we are encouraging. To be clear, the various
methods and ways of doing philosophy of film without theory demonstrated in
this Special Issue are just a few examples of the options, opportunities, and
investigations one might develop and pursue under this open-ended rubric.
From our perspective, if there are to be any constraints here, they would
simply come from the particular films under examination
Briefly, the articles in this Special Issue include Craig Fox’s own paper
in which he asks why Corneliu Porumboiu’s Police, Adjective – nominally
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a film about a police investigation – might incorporate a scene of extended
reading from a dictionary. When placed alongside Wittgenstein’s Lectures on
Aesthetics Fox shows that both the film and the philosophical text can be
said to give suggestions for making sense of each other, and also for training
the viewer and reader aesthetically to make sense of things more generally.
Britt Harrison offers two different ways of engaging with Terrence Malick’s
The New World: one Heideggerian, one Cinematic Humanist. If the first
is theoretical, as she argues it is, then does that entail the second, more
Wittgensteinian, encounter, is no less theoretically committed? Jônadas Te-
chio discerns in Cavell’s diagnosis of modern skepticism a fragile balance be-
tween intimacy and separateness that is constitutive of our human condition.
This inescapable dynamic that sustains our human relatedness is explored
through the ordinary and extraordinary detail of Yasujiro Ozu’s Late Spring.
Katheryn Doran uses her detailed consideration of Christopher Nolan’s In-
somnia to argue that standard ways of articulating the so-called ‘Imposition
Objection’ – which claims that it is the viewer rather than the film that does
or, as Thomas Wartenberg puts it, ‘screens’ philosophy – risk nourishing the
force of the challenge, rather than diffusing it. She resists the assumption
that an argument-based written philosophical text is paradigmatic of what
it is to do philosophy. Kristin Hrehor sets theory aside to consider the re-
sources and insights to be developed through a comparative investigation of
two superficially distinct films of the 1970s: Brian de Palma’s Carrie and
Toshiya Fujita’s Lady Snowblood. In their structural echoes, she finds spe-
cific and non-ideological ways of thinking about mother-daughter relations.
Michael Forest argues that John Ford’s Stagecoach provides an entirely ap-
posite fulfilment of Ralph Waldo Emerson’s clarion call for a new American
scholar. Ironically, or perhaps inevitably, its achievement comes to pass in
a medium, a nascent tradition, and a genre, that Emerson could never have
imagined. Mikel Burley’s close examination of Woody Allen’s Crimes and
Misdemeanours expands the familiar repertoire of readings of the film, simul-
taneously arguing for the value of such plurality. In so doing he articulates
an appreciation of the film as dramatising a non-consequentialist notion of
justice. Shai Tubali develops a three-way exploration of Robert Zemeckis’s
Contact, Denis Villenueve’s Arrival and Albert Camus’ understanding of the
absurdity of the human condition. By paying close attention to the detail
of the films and the protagonists’ dramatic journeys he presents a possible
way of making sense of the visions they offer, embracing their resonances and
tensions. Colin Heber Percy proposes we can appreciate the sacred as having
a cinematic quality, bringing this suggestion to life through his engagement
with Jonathan Glazer’s Under the Skin. Using medieval, Heideggerian and
Ancient Greek insights he explores what it is to see and be seen, and con-
siders the extent to which this offers a revised notion of theory in terms of
theoria. Rob van Gerwen’s contribution investigates the extent to which the
shared gazes of on-screen, actors, models and people can facilitate the Woll-
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heimian distinction between the viewer’s sense of being inside or outside a
picture. He explores these issues through Bresson’s L’Argent and, amongst
others, the work of, Nuri Bilge Ceylan. Finally, Andrew Klevan brings Or-
dinary Language Philosophy and film together for a long-awaited theory-free
encounter. Building on his opening key-note presentation at the Philosophy
of Film Without Theory Conference in 2019, he argues that the methods,
priorities and ambitions of so-called OLP offer a powerful, but to date radi-
cally underused, set of resources for film studies and ways of engaging with
individual films. We thank all the contributors here (and at our inaugural
conference) for their commitment to exploring just some of the opportuni-
ties inherent in philosophy of film without theory. We especially thank editor
Rob van Gerwen for his invitation to co-edit this Special Issue; it has been a
delight and an education. Whilst this new tradition is yet nascent, we trust
that it will continue – at least as long as there are films people want to discuss.
britt.harrison@york.ac.uk and fox@calu.edu
NOTES
1Bordwell and Carroll 1996.
2Bordwell and Carroll 1996, xiv, origi-
nal emphasis.
3Quine 1969, 126.
4Carroll 1996, 37-68.
5Carroll 1996, 63.
6Carroll 1996, 37, 59 and 43.
7See the ‘History and Purpose’ section
of the Society of Cognitive Studies of the
Moving Image website (under FAQs) for
the society’s raison d’être to examine ‘how
the theories and findings of empirical sci-
ence can shed light on the art and craft
of film, television, and other audiovisual
media. More specifically, it supposes that
the field cognitive and brain science, which
has burgeoned since the 1960s, can illumi-
nate many aspects of the workings of mo-
tion pictures. It is with the purpose of
fostering this line of research that a group
of scholars came together, starting in the
mid 1990s.’ Available at: https://scsmi-
online.org/faq [Accessed 5.6.20].
8Harrison (forthcoming).
9See Gaut 2010 for Berys Gaut’s ac-
knowledgement of his Bazinian roots and
his announced interest in sharing many of
the concerns of classical theorists. Gaut
takes recent challenges to the artistic
status of digital media (including non-
photographic moving pictures and video
games) as echoing the challenges faced by
classical theorists in the face of the original
analogue film materials and media.
10See Sinnerbrink 2019 for a four-way
distinction between cognitivist film the-
ory, Cavellian approaches, Deleuzian per-
spectives, and phenomenological and post-
phenomenological ways of engaging with
film. We take it that the Deleuzian, as
well as the phenomenological and post-
phenomenological approaches can be sub-
sumed under our second tradition, these
being recent evolutions within this theo-
retical (Theoretical) approach. See also
Greg Currie’s methodological dualism be-
tween ‘Philosophy of Literature and Film’
(PLF) and ‘Theory of Literature of Film’
(TLF) in his Currie 2016. On Currie’s
account, PLF, (one and the same as cog-
nitive film theory) acknowledges and val-
ues an interest in naturalising and sci-
entifically informed philosophical pursuits
‘often friendly to Darwinian ideas’(Currie
2016, 642); whilst TLF embraces var-
ious semiotic, psychoanalytic, ideologi-
cal, and other theoretical priorities pur-
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sued in academic communities that are
involved in film, media, language, lit-
erature and cultural studies. The for-
mer is typically practised in anglophone,
analytic, philosophical contexts; the lat-
ter has come to dominate more (intellec-
tually) Continental environments includ-
ing non-philosophical humanities depart-
ments in anglophone countries. Borders
between these are, as Currie acknowledges,
‘porous’(Currie 2016, 642).
11See Carroll 2011 for what is perhaps
an example of philosophy of film without
theory from one of the founders of cogni-
tive film theory.
12See also Carroll, Di Summa, and
Loht 2019 for a 9-chapter section on ‘Ap-
proaches and Schools’.
13Rawls, Neiva, and Gouveia 2019.
14Ironically, a contribution from Noël
Carroll sits alongside work exemplifying
aspects of the tradition that was on the
receiving end of his blistering 1996 attack.
15See Wartenberg in Rawls, Neiva, and
Gouveia 2019, ix.
16Philosophy departments increasingly
divide their activities and faculty into
those concerned with ‘theoretical’ or ‘prac-
tical’ philosophy or the ‘history of philos-
ophy’, as if these were all somehow dis-
tinct. Moreover, the pursuit and articula-
tion of theories and the theoretical is not
just the preserve of the first; it is typically
embraced by both theoretical and practi-
cal philosophy as well as being discerned
in the third.
17Kenny 2009, 2.
18See https://philosophyoffilmwithouttheory.
com/ for full details of the conference
speakers and papers and details of the
contributors to Fox and Harrison (forth-
coming).
19See Hacker 2001 and Hacker 2009.
20Wittgenstein 2009, Sec 109.
21This need not rule out parallel, even
competing, efforts towards achieving this
goal. We are just focusing on this one, of
course.
22See Turvey 2001 for critical engage-
ment with ‘Cavell’s Wittgenstein’.
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